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Introduction

The problem of suboptimal local government size stems from historical circumstance (the
evolution of local government structure) and the current nature of vertical intergovernmental relations. Small size itself does not have to be a problem if the intergovernmental structure accounts for differences in scale and capacity. Many European
countries and the US face a local government sector dominated by many small
municipalities. In the US, there are over 39,000 units of multi-purpose local government
(Census of Governments, 2007).

The challenge of suboptimal local government size raises two concerns: 1) capacity - small
size can lead to inadequate financial or managerial capacity, and 2) fragmentation can
undermine efficiency (due to lack of economies of scale) and prevent coordination necessary
for regional economic competitiveness and environmental management. It is these two
concerns, capacity and fragmentation, and their implications for rural government viability
on the one hand and metropolitan regional coordination on the other hand, that drive
scholarly and practical policy interest in the question of suboptimal government size.

The problem of fragmented and suboptimal sized local government is not just a challenge
stemming from external forces and structures (Swanstrom, 2006), it is also an issue for
internal forces as Imbroscio (2006) argues in his critique of scholars who attempt to “shame
the inside game.” To address the challenges of suboptimal government size we need
attention to both the inside and the outside game.
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On the outside – we need attention to the vertical structure of inter-governmental authority
and finance. On the inside – we need attention to capacity and political will. First I will
address the context of vertical inter-governmental relations that can ameliorate or exacerbate
problems of suboptimal local government size. Then I will turn to my attention to the inside
game – what a local government can do on its own to address the challenge. In this second
arena I will give special attention to the possibilities of using privatization or hybrid market
forms of service delivery to address the challenges of suboptimal local government size. In
this review I will focus primarily on the US local government experience and answer the
question, “Can privatization and hybrid forms of service delivery help address the problem
of suboptimal government size?” I will explore what we know from the empirical evidence
on privatization by government size, what explains differences in level of privatization by
size, and how these problems can be addressed by market management strategies.
Suboptimal government size can occur at both ends of the spectrum – too small to realize
scale economies and too large to enjoy market competition. The solutions require more
effective market management: 1) creating more competition by splitting the market, the
service or the management, and 2) promoting coordination by combining markets,
management and services. The paper begins by addressing the overarching context of the
vertical inter-governmental structure of finance and service responsibility that sets the
context for a concern over suboptimal government size. Concerns with equity, regional
coordination and sustainability drive much of the government size debate, but this paper will
show these concerns are not effectively addressed by market management strategies.
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Outside Strategies: External Context and Inter-Governmental Structure
The public choice and anti-consolidationist literature argues there are serious advantages to
small, fragmented local government (Parks and Oakerson, 1993; Bish, 2001). Politically
they afford the opportunity for local difference, diversity and democratic choice. Local
governments are considered “laboratories of democracy,” the place where political skills are
developed and new service delivery innovations are found. Political fragmentation allows
for diversity in service delivery – both in quantity and style of public services. This can lead
to governmental innovation (Osborne and Plastrick, 1997). It can also lead to inequity.

The Fiscal Federalists support fragmentation because it promotes fiscal equivalence –
balancing service delivery with local government revenue (Oates, 1998). This forces fiscal
discipline on local governments and ensures residents get what they pay for and pay for the
services they want to receive. The problem of requesting more services and hoping to free
ride on their delivery is reduced under such a local government system. Curiously the term
‘territorial equivalence’ is used in the Nordic countries to mean just the opposite – to make
equivalent the prospects for local government service even in remote, poor rural areas
(Bryden and Warner, 2012). Although the US recognizes that poor governments constrain
the development prospects of their residents and this poverty of government services
exacerbates territorial inequality (Warner and Pratt, 2005; Johnson, et al., 1995; Stinson,
1968), there is little political will to address the inequity. In the EU by contrast, concern
over social inclusion is one of the drivers behind regional and rural development policy
(Shortall and Warner, 2011; Powell, Boyne and Ashworth, 2001; Stewart, 2003). Research
across the EU, Asia and North America has shown generally that decentralization does not
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lead to improved economic growth (Rodriguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004; Nelson and Foster,
1999). Concerns with regional inequality and redistributional equity are important, not just
for equity reasons, but also for economic growth.

Australia and New Zealand embarked on major consolidation efforts over the last decade –
to mixed effect. While they gained the ability to plan and coordinate service delivery on a
larger scale (to address environmental concerns like watersheds, and urban concerns like
transportation management), they faced a governance challenge of rebuilding citizen identity
and participation in the new, larger units of local government. Recent research has shown
that these larger units are not cheaper (Byrnes and Dollery 2002; Dollery and Johnson,
2005), but they are more professional and may be providing services that better coordinate
across a larger scale and as such may help position localities to compete more effectively in
a global world (Holzer and Fry, 2011; Aulich et al., 2011). During a 2010 national local
government conference in Australia, officers from New South Wales and Victoria – two
states that conducted major amalgamations in the last decade – indicated that no one wanted
to go back to the earlier system. Consolidation has enhanced strategic capacity but still
leaves revenue and service delivery challenges (Aulich, et al. 2011, McKinlay 2011a).

In the US, and in much of Europe, consolidation of local government has not been a major
policy thrust. In the US political support for localism is very high (Briffault, 2000). As in
Australia, local governments are controlled by the states, so there is much diversity in local
government authority and structure across the fifty states (Frug and Barron, 2009).
However, local governments in the US have more service responsibility (police, social
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welfare, education) than in Australia and most of Europe. In the US there have been few
voluntary amalgamations despite much academic research touting the benefits (Orfield,
1997, 2002; Rusk, 1993, 1999). Instead, attention has shifted to functional consolidation in
specific service areas. This functional consolidation is both top down and bottom up. The
primary example of top down consolidation is found in the Metropolitan Planning
Organizations required by the Federal government in order to help manage federal
transportation funds (Downs, 1994). The bottom up forms are based on voluntary
cooperation either as service specific inter-governmental contracting (which in the US is as
common as for profit contracting), or in regional councils of government (Warner, 2011b).
However, these service specific forms of coordination are critiqued for being limited in
focus, professional in organization, and undemocratic (Frug, 1999). A body of academic
research is assessing whether these functional consolidation approaches can achieve the
equity and multi-functional coordination that is really needed (Bollens, 1997; Lowe, 2011;
Pastor et al., 2009). Regional councils of government may offer more promise as they are
both multi-functional and composed of elected officials, not just technocrats (Korsching et
al., 1992).

Voluntary approaches are celebrated in the US both theoretically and practically. Public
Choice theory is founded on the notion that a competitive market of local government is
both efficient and democratic. Charles Tiebout’s famous 1956 article celebrates the
possibility of efficiency achieved through a competitive, fragmented local government
structure. The rise of suburban local governments in the US in the 1950s gave credence to
the power of a fragmented local government system based on mobility and choice.
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However, reviews of the evidence point to problems with information asymmetry, resource
inequality and lack of mobility – especially for the poor (Lowery, 2000). Community
choice is driven by more than preference for a specific tax and service combination. Race
continues to be a major signaling mechanism (Trout, 2000; Lichter, et al., 2007; Marsh, et
al., 2010). Resource and service inequality in a fragmented local government system
undermines regional equity across the metropolitan region (Frug, 1999; Frug and Barron,
2008; Pastor et al., 2009; Marsh, et al., 2010). For rural areas, fragmentation and suboptimal government size leads to problems of “government poverty” and reduced
opportunities for residents (Stinson, 1968; Reeder and Jansen, 1995; Warner, 2001; Warner
and Pratt, 2005; Dewees, Lobao and Swanson, 2003). Katz (2001) describes this system of
differing levels of public services based on residential location as the “price of citizenship”
in a fragmented, decentralized system. Although planners promote consolidation as a
preferred option (Rusk, 1993; 1999; Orfield, 1997; 2002), support for consolidation in the
US remains limited and weak. It is now recognized that attention must be focused on the
political structure and preferences in order to achieve support for regional integration (Pastor
et al., 2009).

It is possible to promote administrative decentralization to achieve the objectives of
democracy and localized input while maintaining fiscal centralization to ensure more equity
in the delivery of public goods (Prud homme, 1995). Both neoclassical and Marxists
scholars agree that local government will be focused primarily on developmental services
over redistributional ones (Schneider, 1989; Peterson, 1981; O’Connor, 1973). And yet
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redistributive services are the more important ones to ensure individual mobility and social
inclusion. In the US, even education and health expenditures are financed heavily at the
local government level. This is part of what makes local government fragmentation such a
serious problem for equity and socio economic mobility in the United States.

Inter-governmental aid or centralization of fiscal responsibility can address inequality in
resources and reduce the capacity problems of small local governments. Administrative
decentralization may be optimal – for the service diversity and innovation noted above,
while fiscal decentralization may be undesirable due to inequality of resources across the
local government landscape. It is possible to have administrative decentralization without
fiscal decentralization. Thus one structural solution to the problem of suboptimal local
government size is greater intergovernmental aid or centralization of fiscal responsibility to
higher levels of government. Models of spatial inequality among local governments in the
US have found centralization of fiscal responsibility upward to the state is more important
than state aid in relieving inequality of effort across local governments (Warner, 2001;
Warner and Pratt, 2005). In the public education sector, a series of fiscal equalization suits
are making their way through the state courts now and forcing a redesign of the educational
finance system toward more state centralization of fiscal responsibility (Baicker and
Gordon, 2006). Analysis of the results of such fiscal equalization in education expenditure
in California, where the experience is the longest, shows greater equality in finance but a
leveling down of the public finance of education on a per pupil basis (Silva and Sonstelie,
1995). Peterson (1981) argues, and the empirical research shows, that the upper income tax
payer, who can’t capture the benefits of extra tax for his own children, is less likely to

Does Local Government Size Matter? Privatization and Hybrid Systems of Local Service Delivery

9

support overall tax increases for all. Maintaining broad political support is the challenge of
centralization/redistribution schemes, especially in societies like the US where notions of
social inclusion have little policy salience.

Although fiscal equivalence is a primary justification for local government fragmentation in
the US, states often place limits on the level of local choice regarding taxation and service
levels. More than half the states have implemented tax or expenditure limitations, TELs, on
local governments. TELs are typically proposed in an effort to keep taxes down and limit
the size of government budgets. Their effectiveness in this regard remains unproven
(IUCUPE, 1995; Resnick, 2004). Local governments get around the limits by promoting
special districts which have their own taxing authority outside the government limit. They
also increase reliance on user fees. The general conclusion on TELS is that they do not
result in lower expenditures but do result in lower accountability and more fragmentation
(due to the proliferation of special districts) –exacerbating the problem of sup-optimal
government size in terms of both scale and scope economies.

The US has some of the most fiscally autonomous local governments in the world. Locally
raised revenue accounts for about 57% of local government budgets, state aid for close to
40%, and Federal aid for less than 3% (US Census of Government 2002). In addition
education expenditures are primarily a local government responsibility in the US, in stark
contrast to most other OECD nations where education is a national responsibility.
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Thus it is clear that the structure of inter-governmental fiscal and service responsibilities
matters to the question of suboptimal local government size. The more competencies and
the lower the level of redistributive aid or fiscal centralization of expenditure responsibility,
the more important the problem of suboptimal government size becomes. In the US,
inequity is an important and persistent result (Brown and Warner, 1991).

Because the quality of local services, especially education, varies so widely across local
governments, residents consider their local public services as “private” e.g. just for residents
inside their jurisdictional borders. These service quality differences reinforce political
boundaries and reduce political support for regional coordination (Frug, 1999). These
boundary differences help explain the emergence of independent cities (seceding from their
counties in Virginia), or new city formation as rich suburbs incorporate to avoid sharing
resources with the larger municipality of which they were formally a part. Far from the
elastic city that expands to encompass its suburbs that David Rusk (1999) calls for, we
instead see the fragmentation of the metro region to ensure continued inequality in service
delivery. Some of these new cities have emerged as contract cities – trying to avoid creating
a government apparatus and relying heavily on contracting to provide their service needs
(McKinlay 2011a).

The emergence of private interest governments at the neighborhood level reflects a further
fragmentation. Most new residential development is in these private interest developments
in the US and in much of Europe and the developing world (Nelson, 2005; Glasze, et al.,
2006). While these club approaches to service delivery are efficient within the club
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(Webster and Lai, 2003), they have problems with long term sustainability and coordination
across the city and metropolitan region (Warner, 2011a).

Now I will shift my attention from the ‘outside’ - the structure of local government
organization and finance - and in the rest of this chapter I will look at the ‘inside’ specifically the role contracting can play in helping municipalities address the problem of
suboptimal size. However, we need to be cognizant of the broader political and economic
context in which contracting, as a strategy should be understood.

Inside Strategies: Contracting and Hybrid Market Approaches
Contracting is a primary mechanism local governments can use to address suboptimal
government size. If their jurisdiction lacks sufficient size to enjoy economies of scale, they
can join with other neighboring governments or contract with private providers to deliver
services. Contracts to private providers or to other local governments can help
municipalities realize scale economies without consolidation. Early studies by the anticonsolidationists pointed to the popularity and efficiency of inter-governmental contracting
as the reason why consolidation was unnecessary (Parks and Oakerson, 1993; Bish and
Ostrom, 1973). Back office services, such as police dispatch, are especially strong
candidates for inter-governmental contracting (they enjoy economies of scale), and this
leaves “high touch” services with close contact with residents, such as police patrols, local.
Local identity can be as important a factor in service delivery as concerns with efficiency
(Warner and Hebdon, 2001) and this is especially important for services which have high
resident contact.
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In the US, the International City County Management Association has tracked the levels of
use of alternative service delivery among local governments. What we find is that intergovernmental contracting and private for profit contracting are the two most common
alternatives to direct public provision. Under for profit contracting local governments often
face problems maintaining competition and adequate information for benchmaking, thus one
hybrid innovation that US local governments pursue is to mix public delivery and
contracting for the same service. Analysis of this mixed market delivery shows that it is
driven by concerns with cost savings and lack of competition, is more likely to be practiced
by local governments with professional managers, and reflects a growing concern over
citizen satisfaction with service (Warner and Hefetz, 2008). Local government managers
attempt to balance multiple objectives - efficiency, service quality and market management.
Mixed market strategies give local government managers more involvement and control in
their public service markets.

This paper is primarily concerned with differences in the use of these major alternatives by
government size. Figure 1 shows the use of direct public delivery and the major alternatives
– for profit contracting, inter-governmental cooperation and mixed public/contracting by
population using US local government data recently released by ICMA for 2007.

Does Local Government Size Matter? Privatization and Hybrid Systems of Local Service Delivery

13

Figure 1 Service Delivery Trends by Population Size, US Municipalities, 2007

60.0%

50.0%
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Percents do not some to 100 because mixed delivery involves multiple categories and nonprofit delivery is not included.
International City County Management Association Alternative Service Delivery Survey
data 2007: Author Analysis. N=1474. Population categories: 2,500 – 5,000 = 136, 5,001 –
10,000 = 139, 10,001 – 50,000 =811, 50,001 – 150,000 = 260, greater than 150,001 = 128;
US Census of Population, 2000.
What Figure 1 shows clearly is that direct public delivery is more prevalent at the two ends
of the population spectrum. Governments with small population and those with large
population have higher levels of direct public provision (a sort of U shaped curve). For
profit privatization has the opposite pattern – an inverted U with the highest rates among the
mid-sized governments (10,000-50,000 population). Inter-governmental cooperation is
more common among the smaller governments and drops as population size increases.
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Mixed delivery rises steadily with population size as it requires a large enough scale to split
the market into public and contracted components.

These results reflect a general pattern found in the literature on privatization and alternative
service delivery in the US (Warner 2006a, 2009; Joassart-Marcelli and Musso, 2005;
Warner and Hefetz, 2002a, 2002b, 2003; Nelson, 1997; Hirsch, 1995; Ferris and Graddy,
1994; Kodrzyski, 1994). Smaller communities face less competitive markets of alternative
private suppliers and thus rely more heavily on contracting with neighboring governments or
direct public provision. Mid-sized communities have higher rates of both privatization and
cooperation because they exist in a market of other mid-sized communities which creates
more opportunities for both privatization and cooperation. Large communities have lower
use of both alternatives because they already enjoy internal economies of scale and the
market of similar sized communities is smaller. Similar results have been found in Spain
and the Netherlands (Bel and Mur, 2009; Bel and Fageda, 2006, 2010; Bel et al., 2010).

The issue is not just one of population size; it also reflects geographical location. Figure 2
presents the US data by metro status – rural, suburban and urban. We see a similar pattern
to Figure 1 above. Public delivery is U shaped with highest reliance on public delivery in
rural and metro core places. For profit delivery is an inverted U – highest in suburbs.
Cooperation is similar for rural and suburban municipalities but lower among metro core
places. Mixed delivery is lowest for rural places and higher for suburb and metro core
municipalities.
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Figure 2 Service Delivery Trends by Metro Status, US Municipalities, 2007
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Percents do not some to 100 because mixed delivery involves multiple categories and nonprofit delivery is not included.
International City County Management Association Alternative Service Delivery Survey
data 2007: Author Analysis. N=1474, Metro=262, Suburb=784, Rural=428.
What explains these differences across size and metropolitan status? The answers lie in cost
of service delivery, nature of market and capacity of local government. The population and
metro status figures reinforce a similar message. Rural and small municipalities are less
likely to use privatization and more likely to use cooperation or direct public delivery.
Research has shown that small rural communities have higher costs of service delivery – the
costs of sparsity (Reeder and Jansen, 1995; Warner, 2001). They also face more limited
markets of alternative private suppliers. Despite a competitive market ethos in the US, real
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levels of competition are low in most public service markets. This causes local government
managers to spend inordinate amounts of time chasing and nurturing competition (Johnston
and Girth, forthcoming). This market management activity comes at the expense of time
spent on monitoring and accountability.

Inadequate competition is a problem across the size spectrum but especially serious for
small rural governments. In a national survey of levels of competition in local markets for
local public services, Warner and Hefetz (2010) found rural municipalities faced on average
only 1.1 alternative suppliers for each service as compared to 1.8 for suburban and metro
core places. Lack of competition in the private market leads rural communities to rely more
heavily on a public market of inter-governmental cooperation. Metro core municipalities, at
the other extreme, face the costs of congestion which require a more complex and higher
level of service delivery. This limits the number of alternative providers with the capacity to
meet metro core needs. The large scale of metro governments also reduces the need to go to
market as many services have exhausted any economy of scale advantages at much lower
levels of population. Medium sized and suburban communities appear to enjoy dual
advantages here – they engage alternative forms of delivery at higher levels than either end
of the metro status or population spectrum and they face a more competitive market of
alternative supplies.

The pictures presented in Figures 1 and 2 are confirmed in statistical analysis. Regression
analyses of for profit contracting and inter-municipal contracting for the 2002 and 2007
period (the most recent data available) are given in Table 1 below. The models show that
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for profit privatization is more commonly found among local governments that have larger
populations and are suburban. Inter-government contracting, by contrast, is more common
among local governments with smaller populations, and among counties and suburbs –
places that have the capacity and need to cooperate to gain scale. While for profit
contracting is more common among places with higher incomes and lower poverty (more
attractive markets), cooperation is income neutral and more likely to be found in
communities with higher poverty – suggesting cooperation has some pro-equity effects. For
a complete description of model variables and results (see Hefetz et al. 2012).

A similar dual market structure has been found in Spain where small municipalities face
competition from smaller, regional firms, and large cities face competition from large
national and international firms (Bel and Fageda, 2011). Concentration in public service
markets for waste collection is also well documented in the Netherlands (Dijkgraaf and
Gradus, 2007; 2008) and in the UK (Davies, 2007). Lack of competition in public service
markets leads to less privatization and more inter-governmental contracting (Brown and
Potoski, 2003; Levin and Tadelis, 2010; Hefetz and Warner, 2011). Past research has found
cooperation to have more pro-equity effects than privatization and differences in use of
market alternatives explained more by market attractiveness (wealth, metropolitan status)
than by managerial characteristics (Warner and Hefetz, 2002a; 2002b; 2003; Warner, 2006a;
2009; Hefetz, et al., 2012).
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Table 1 Regression Results for U.S. Cities and Counties, 2002-2007

Parameter

Inter-Municipal
Contracting
2002
2007

For-Profit
Contracting
2002
2007

Ln(Population)

-.046*

-.064*

.033*

.014*

Suburb Dummy

.194*

.117*

.111*

.138*

County Dummy

.231*

.110*

-.027

-.146*

Total Local Expenditure Per Capita

-.018

.006

-.040*

.006

.048

-.007

.121*

.120*

Percent Poverty

.005*

.223

-.004*

-.091

Efficiency/Monitoring Index

.166*

-.082*

.296*

.242*

Voice Index

.017

.238*

.213*

.025

Internal Opposition Index

.037

.008

.062*

-.058*

-.090*

-.032

.005

.092*

State or federal mandates

.019

-.003

-.068*

-.004

Change in political climate

-.055

-.149*

.045

-.039

Council Manager Dummy

.076*

.062*

.061*

-.005

-1.631*

-.417

-2.608*

-2.442*

Ln(Per Capita Income)

External fiscal pressures

Intercept
* Sig. at P<0.05

Source: Author Analysis drawn from Hefetz, Warner and Vigoda-Gadot, 2012

So what is the problem of suboptimal government size as regards privatization and
alternative forms of service delivery? We see problems on two ends and in the middle.
Both small rural governments and large metro core governments engage market alternatives
at a lower rate than their medium sized and suburban counterparts. The solution then points
to efforts to enhance size and scale at the lower end by promoting more cooperation among
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small rural places so they can more effectively contract with each other and with private
market providers. At the metro core end of the spectrum government may be “too large” and
we may gain efficiencies by splitting the market or the service so that we can increase
market attractiveness. These strategies both involve creating a market – either by
cooperating to gain scale or by splitting a service or a market to create competition. But
there is also a problem in the middle. Suburban fragmentation does not address the
problems of service coordination across a metropolitan region. So from a local government
unit perspective, the suboptimal size problem is primarily a rural, small community problem.
But from a metropolitan regional perspective, suburban fragmentation impedes a
coordinated regional view.

Constructing Markets
The promise of privatization and hybrid strategies is that local governments may be able to
overcome the disadvantages of sub optimal size through market management. The analysis
above has shown how contracting to private providers or other governments and mixed
strategies are used by local governments at differential rates across size, geographic and
economic characteristics. What follows below is a more in depth discussion of how local
governments can create a market either by combining to gain scale (cooperation) or splitting
a service or a market to create competition. Both of these strategies require an explicit local
government role in creating and managing markets. A third hybrid strategy is the use of
mixed public and private approaches at the level of the market or of the firm. A central
theme in all of these market-type alternatives is the need for government capacity to manage
markets and promote coordination. Small and rural municipalities use these market
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approaches at lower rates as they require scale (to split the market or the service) and
management capacity (to combine markets or create mixed strategies) which the smallest
municipalities lack. Research has shown it is not ideology, but market attractiveness and
limited managerial capacity that explains the lower use of privatization and mixed strategies
by small rural governments (Warner and Hefetz 2003, Warner and Hefetz, 2008; Warner
2006a, 2009, Bel and Mur, 2009; Bel and Fageda, 2006; 2007).

Combining Markets to Gain Scale
In the US inter-governmental contracting is highest in social welfare services (child welfare,
welfare eligibility, drug programs, job training) and infrastructure services (transit, airports,
hazardous waste management). These are services that require coordination across the
metropolitan region as labor markets, transit regions and waste disposal (as opposed to
collection) all operate at a larger geographic scale than just one municipality. Cooperation
in social welfare services reflects the need for technical expertise that can be shared across
several municipalities. In Spain, Bel and Mur (2009) find small rural communities
cooperate even in waste collection and in doing so are able to deliver a more frequent
service at lower cost. Many small Spanish municipalities overcome the problem of small
size by cooperating to gain scale and then privatizing (Bel, 2006; Bel and Mur, 2009; Bel
and Fageda, 2006). This gives them a scale to be seen in the market and to negotiate better
terms with private operators. Despite this, Bel and Fageda (2011) still find that small rural
municipalities mostly have contracts with small firms that operate on a local basis, while
large firms that operate on a national basis dominate the markets in larger municipalities.
They find this structure limits competition and the potential for cost savings. In the
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Netherlands, inter-municipal cooperation typically leads to delivery by a public firm and this
helps promote competition as public firms bid for contracts outside their own jurisdiction
(something not possible in Spain) (Bel et al., 2010).

Spain has some promising approaches with its mancomunidades and comarcas that are able
to engage both public and private service delivery at a larger scale (Fernandez, 2007). Italy
has seen the emergence of multi-utilities which combine across services to enjoy economies
of scope and multi-government firms (in the same service) to gain scale (Bognetti and
Robotti, 2007). In the Netherlands, multi-government public firms are common in refuse
collection and help promote competition with private providers (Dijkgraaf and Gradus 2007;
2008). Australia has created a set of regional councils which are given the technical capacity
to coordinate across local governments (Holzer and Fry, 2011). Councils of Government in
the US reflect a similar effort at cooperation (Korsching et al, 1992). These cooperative
approaches allow a small and fragmented local government system to gain the scale
necessary to either provide the services publicly or to contract out with private providers and
thus gain efficiency and service coordination goals. However, the ability to address the
redistribution and equity challenges is less clear as cooperation involves voluntary strategies
and governments may be less likely to cooperate with higher need, lower income neighbors
(Warner, 2006b; Hefetz et al., 2012).

Strategies which combine services or government units to gain scale are most important in
helping rural, small governments compete in the market for public goods. However, even in
these circumstances competition is still quite limited. The examples below focus on
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splitting the market, the service or the management to increase competition. These strategies
require a scale and capacity that the smallest, rural local governments do not have. Thus
these strategies are more effective in addressing the challenges at the other end of the
spectrum when government may be too large. These splitting strategies can be used for
smaller rural governments only if some form of cooperation – to gain scale and promote
inter-governmental coordination - precedes the splitting of the market, service or
management.

Splitting Markets to Create Competition
For many local government services, economies of scale are exhausted at 20,000 to 25,000
population (Holzer and Fry, 2001). Thus larger municipalities may benefit from splitting
their service markets. In the US this is especially common in garbage collection where a
city will split its market into districts and contract out some while keeping others public.
Such mixed market delivery helps ensure continued competition even after contracts are let
and prevents the substitution of a private monopoly for a public one (Warner and Hefetz,
2008). It also enables the public sector to benchmark costs by staying in the business of
providing waste collection services. Miranda and Lerner (1994) attribute the lower costs in
mixed delivery systems in the US to this ability to benchmark. A final advantage is fail safe
control. In the event of contract failure, the public sector retains capacity (equipment, crew
and sector knowledge) to provide the service. Mixed market delivery is less common in
Europe (Bel and Fageda, 2010) – although Barcelona has employed this technique in both
waste collection (Bel and Warner, 2009) and transit services (Albalate, et al., 2012). One
key benefit of splitting the market is the ability to maintain competition in the market after
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contracts are let. Otherwise competition will erode and subsequent calls will find few
bidders as the losers left the market and a private monopoly has now been substituted for a
public one. For small communities, however, these mixed market strategies are uncommon.
Their markets are not large enough to split, and this helps explain the lower levels of
competition in small and rural communities.

Splitting the Service
Another approach is to split the service into its component parts and contract out those
elements that are more commonly found in the market (back office processes, printing,
dispatch), and keep those elements that have high citizen contact public. This is commonly
found in police services where the dispatch and criminal investigation functions are often
contracted to an inter-governmental level and direct road patrols are kept local. Another
common example of splitting the service is in transit where different elements of the service
are provided by different parties. Public commuter transit is run by a public agency, paratransit for the elderly and disabled may be run by a private entity or a non-profit (involving
volunteer drivers), and van pools for rural outlying areas are run by small private firms (or
by cooperatives of riders). All elements of the system are coordinated regarding routes, and
there may be joint sharing of garage and maintenance facilities (Warner and Hefetz, 2008).
Key to the effectiveness of these mixed delivery systems is joint coordination to manage
congestion and ensure public objectives (no cream skimming) are met (Barter, 2008). It is
possible for small communities to participate in these mixed service schemes if they are
organized as an inter-governmental collaborative, and for transit services, they often are
(Warner and Hefetz, 2008; Albalate et al., 2012).
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Mixing Public and Private Management at the Level of the Firm
In general European local governments are more likely to mix management and finance
between public and private sectors at the level of the firm, rather than mixing public and
private delivery at the level of the market as in the US (Warner and Bel, 2008). Public firms
and mixed public-private firms enable government to retain economies of scale (without
splitting the market) and to retain public sector control (on the Board of Directors) but
permit private management and private sector labor relations which promote flexibility.
These mixed firms evolved in part from the old State Owned Enterprise sector. But in recent
years there have been efforts to instill more internal market discipline through private sector
labor and management approaches in a process of corporatization. Berlin used a mixed firm
approach to upgrade technology in its urban bus transit sector and to encourage labor
shedding and wage reductions after unification (Swarts, 2010). Mixed firms are common in
Spain in both water and waste collection (Warner and Bel, 2008).

These hybrid firms are of two general types: public firms which have more flexibility in
work force organization and purchasing than public bureaucracy, and mixed public-private
firms where the government retains a control stake in the firm, but the firm operates under
private commercial law. Public firms, or municipal corporations, are becoming more
common in Portugal (Tavares and Camoes, 2007), Spain (Bel and Mur, 2009; Bel and
Fageda, 2010), Italy (Bognotti and Robotti, 2007), the Netherlands (Dijkgraaf and Gradus
2007; 2008) and Norway (Sørenson, 2007). By operating on an enterprise basis, they instill
market logics inside the firm. In mixed public/private firms, the private partner may be a
large firm with a solid position in the market and local government (or a collaborative of
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local governments) engage in long term contracts with the private firm as a joint venture
(Bel, 2006). Day to day operations are usually conducted by the industrial private partner,
but government retains control over strategic decisions. These new forms of public
enterprise are emerging to address the need to retain economies of scale by creating
monopoly service providers that are flexible and market oriented but responsive to public
control. The central theme is the need for public planning and control even while market
management and flexibility are pursued (Del Bo and Florio, 2011). Public firms can also be
used to achieve economies of scale by contracting with several municipalities as in the
Netherlands and Italy, or economies of scope where the multi-utility is a public firm which
operates several utilities on an enterprise basis as found in Italy (Bognotti and Robotti, 2007)
and New Zealand (McKinlay, 2011b).

I will illustrate an example of the power of a public/private mixed firm by a child care social
cooperative I visited in the city of Parma, Italy in 2010. The local government wished to
increase the supply of child care and wanted to attract both private finance and a private
manager to achieve more flexible labor relations. They created a new mixed firm, Parma
Infancia, with control from the local government (which provides subsidies for child care
and thus ensures effective consumer demand in the market) and finance from private banks
to build new centers. The Director is a banker, and management is by a social cooperative
with national scale in elder and child care. The mixed firm has succeeded in building
several new centers, expanding a quality child care system to meet community demand, and
has done so at costs 30% lower than what the local government could achieve alone. Cost
savings are attributed to greater flexibility in labor scheduling.
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The advantage of these hybrid organizational approaches to service delivery is that the local
government, as a partner in the enterprise, has more control over decisions regarding the
service, and easier access to information on the service and on the firm. This reduces the
costs of monitoring – a key contract cost - thus reducing overall transaction costs. The goal
of such mixed firms is that managers “will give more weight to the objectives of local
government and will give less weight to profit maximization.” (Warner and Bel, 2008: 5). In
the US, by contrast, where more emphasis is given to creating competition in the market,
managers have less time to spend on monitoring and accountability because they spend so
much time creating and nurturing competition (Johnston and Girth, forthcoming).

Mixed firms capture the benefits of economies of scale with monopoly provision, but they
maintain public control and gain management and labor flexibility. This creates a more
stable form of privatization in Europe. In the US, where managers focus their efforts on
creating mixed markets with competition between public and private delivery, privatization
is both lower and more unstable (Warner and Bel, 2008). Reverse privatization is relatively
unknown in Europe and not measured by any national surveys – except Spain which found
almost none (Bel, 2006). By contrast, reverse privatization ranges from 12 to 18 percent of
service delivery in the US and is comparable to levels of new contracting out (Hefetz and
Warner, 2004, 2007). However, smaller rural governments have lower levels of both mixed
delivery and contracting back in. Both of these market management approaches require
capacity and scale sufficient to play in a market –something small municipalities lack.
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Cost Savings and Privatization
Differential rates of privatization are of special concern if there are cost savings with
privatization. However, the data on privatization and cost savings does not show clear
support for cost savings (Hirsch, 1995; Boyne, 1998; Hodge, 2000; Bel et al., 2010). Water
distribution and solid waste collection are the two municipal services with the largest
experience with contracting out around the world, and a meta-regression analysis of
published studies in these two services does not find support for cost savings under private
production (Bel, Fageda and Warner, 2010). Water, as a natural monopoly, does not benefit
from splitting the market. Privatization merely results in the substitution of a private
monopoly for a public one. Strong regulation of water quality prevents cost savings due to
quality reductions. Europe in general has higher levels of privatization. In England and
Wales water service has been privatized completely, in France about 52% of the service is
private, in Spain about 45% of the service is private, in Germany, Belgium and Finland and
Italy between 5 and 20 percent is private (Bel, 2006). The remaining EU-15 countries have
almost no privatization (Bel, 2006). France has a long history of private corporations
providing water but recently there have been some important reversals such as the high
profile re-municipalization of water in Paris where the city decided it can provide water via
the public sector more efficiently. Italy, in 2011, overturned a law requiring water
privatization. Spain has higher levels of water privatization 42% than in the US 10%
(Warner and Bel, 2008). Consistent with the general findings on privatization and
government size above, the highest levels of water privatization in Spain are among the
municipalities in the 10,000 - 100,000 population range (Bel, 2006).
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Solid waste collection has more potential for gains from privatization. Economies of scale
are exhausted at about 20,000 population (Stevens, 1978) and this creates potential for gains
from privatization even by smaller municipalities. The waste sector is also characterized by
technological innovation (trash burn facilities, recycling, new approaches to landfills) and
private firms typically capture innovations more quickly than the public sector. For these
reasons, privatization levels in solid waste are typically higher than in water. In the US
private delivery is found in 47% of municipalities. In Spain it is over half, in Denmark,
Sweden and Norway it is over 75%, and in Ireland, the UK, Netherlands and Italy
privatization is around 40 percent (Bel, 2006). In Spain privatization rates are lower for
municipalities under 10,000 population. In the US privatization of solid waste follows the
inverted U shaped pattern – lower for rural (39%), highest for suburbs (57%) and lower for
metro core (29%) communities (author analysis of ICMA 2007 data).

Markets alone, through liberalization and privatization, have not delivered lower prices or
higher consumer satisfaction in network infrastructure services in the EU (gas, telecom,
electricity, water, transit), (Ceriani, Doronzo and Florio, M., 2009; Clifton and DíazFuentes, 2010). Public service markets require management – to ensure quality, to maintain
competition, and to ensure broader service coordination. There needs to be a strong
principal, ensuring coordination and that public objectives are met. Barter (2008) has shown
this critical public coordination role in transit, Clark and Bradshaw (2004) in electricity
markets, Hipp and Warner (2008) in job training, and Warner and Gradus (2011) in child
care. The problem for small governments, is they lack the capacity to effectively manage
markets. Some form of coordination is needed to help small governments gain the scale
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sufficient to secure market power to manage their public service markets. This is where
inter-municipal cooperation plays such a critical role both as an alternative delivery form
when competition is low (Hefetz and Warner, 2011; Levin and Tadelis, 2010) and as a
means to gain scale and market power for privatization to work (Bel et al., 2010; Bel and
Mur, 2009; Bel and Fageda, 2006).

Conclusion
This paper has explored the question of suboptimal government size and the potential of
inside strategies involving privatization and hybrid delivery approaches. We have seen that
privatization and hybrid delivery strategies are less common among the smallest rural
governments. What is required to effectively engage markets, is to be in a market that
attracts competitive suppliers (most common among mid-sized governments and suburbs),
or to have the management capacity to build competition, gain scale and manage mixed
delivery strategies. Small, rural governments are at a disadvantage in each of these
circumstances. Solutions to the problem of suboptimal size require both inside and outside
management strategies. This analysis has shown the limits of inside management strategies
that focus on privatization and hybrid approaches for the smallest rural governments.

An outside management strategy is also needed. This can involve cooperation among local
governments to gain scale and visibility to more effectively participate in the market, or it
can involve a restructuring of governmental finance and service delivery competencies to
better match the scale at which the service needs to be coordinated. This outside approach
requires some level of vertical coordination and hierarchical power. Local governments, on
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their own, will limit collaboration to those arenas in which it is clearly in their self interest.
Challenges at the metropolitan regional scale require a regional view which is often lost in a
fragmented local government system. Voluntary cooperation typically focuses on the
services which are easier to address – making it harder to build political support for the
services with more inequity across the metropolitan region (Frug, 2002).

Problems with market approaches to address the challenge of sub-optimal government size
occur at two ends of the spectrum. The smallest governments are least attractive and least
able to play in market systems for public service delivery. This denies many rural areas the
opportunity to effectively explore the benefits of service delivery innovation. At the
metropolitan regional scale, the problem of suboptimal government size is the problem of
fragmentation and the inability to coordinate and finance service delivery across the
metropolitan region. This constrains regional economic development (Nelson and Foster,
1999). Solutions to each of these problems lie in collaboration – whether voluntary or
forced – to encourage service and resource sharing and promote a regional coordinated
view.
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